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POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY IN THE BLACK 
AFRICAN CONTEXT 
John A. Wiseman 
University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne 
In my book Political Leaders in Black Africa I present shon 
biographical essays on several hundred politicians of the post-
independence period. 1 My brief was to write biographies of a 
multiplicity of individual politicians rather than, as is more 
commonly the case in political biography, to write about a single 
political actor. Also, the black African context creates a dissimi-
larity with most political biographies, because in most biogra-
phies the subjects are .predominantly European or American, 
though there are occasional exceptions like Mao Zedong or 
Mohandas K. Gandhi. In spite of these differences the writing of 
political biography raises common questions and problems to 
which a comparative approach may be applied. 
Political biography implies a recognition of the fact that 
individual political leaders are important and cannot be seen as 
mere corks bobbing about on an uncontrollable sea of impersonal 
social and economic forces. Individuals make decisions from a 
range of options which allow for different outcomes. While the 
choice of decision is necessarily constrained by factors beyond the 
individual, it is not predetermined. These decisions have conse-
quences, and if the individual making them is powerful and 
influential, these consequences will have an impact on the politi-
cal process. Thus an adequate understanding of politics involves 
an appreciation of the role played by individual political actors, 
especially those we could categorize as political leaders. 
However, there is an inherent danger in this approach, 
because it could lead us back to a "great man" theory of political 
development in which everything is explained as the outcome of 
the actions, ideas and whims of an individual leader, who is 
praised or blamed for all that happens. Indeed, powerful political 
leaders may themselves encourage this approach through the 
development of massive personality cults (e.g. Adolph Hitler, 
Josef Stalin, Kim Il Sung, Kwame Nkrumah, etc.). Political 
biographers have to be acutely sensitive to the circumstances in 
which the individual under study is active politically. Biogra-
phers must consider a range of social, economic and historical 
circumstances. Since politics is the art of the possible, it is these 
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factors that determine what it is possible for actors to do. Biog-
raphers cannot make realistic assessments of an individual outside 
this context. 
Good political biography involves an understanding of the 
two-way relationship between ~ndivid~al political leaders and 
their political environments. This may mvolve an assessment of 
how individual leaders misjudge the opponunities and constraints 
which face them; and that assessment requires biographers to 
consider political skills, which are very difficult indeed to specify. 
During the development of political science over the last 
fifty years , political biography has not figured especially promi-
nently.2 An emphasis on ~n_dividuals has appeared antithetical to 
the various models of polmcal systems that were developed and 
less than amenable to the mass statistical techniques that were 
favored in the profession. Some political scientists, of course, did 
write political biography, but when they did so, they were seen as 
political historians. I regard this distinction as anificial , although 
it might be the case that the pursuit of biographical studies outside 
"political science" has worked to the benefit of everyone, in that 
biographers have avoided the worst excesses of faddish "scien-
tific" methodologies. Indeed I would regard it as retrograde if 
political biographers were now to feel the need to develop a 
biographical paradigm. A comparative study of different method-
ologies is an entirely different matter and should be welcomed . 
BIOGRAPHY IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT 
In the literature on African politics, political biography has never 
had a prominent role, but its use has nonetheless fluctuated. In the 
1960s, the first post-independence decade, there were a few 
political biographies of major nationalist leaders (Nkrumah, Ju-
lius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, Jomo Kenyatta, etc .). A majority 
of these were written by journalists or by people who had worked 
with the leaders themselves, rather than by academics . This 
should not be taken as criticism, as I have a high regard for good 
quality journalism. 
In the 1970s, biography tended to dry up because of 
dependency theory, according to which the workings of African 
political systems were to be explained in the context of interna-
tio~al capitalism . This approach tended to relegate indigenous 
African factors to a position of secondary importance, epiphe-
nomena of a globally-determined structure. It would be difficult 
to imagine a theoretical system less conducive to the focus on the 
individual. 
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In the 1980s, recognition of indigenous African factors as 
causal elements in structuring African political systems once 
again increased. This was due in part to a recognition of the 
importance of political leadership, heralded in 1982 by the publi-
cation of Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg's hugely 
influential Personal Rule in Black Africa. 3 Their argument was 
that in Africa weak institutionalization tended to produce a 
situation in which individual leaders, of widely varying types, 
exercized a degree of political influence which would be more 
difficult to obtain in established systems. Personal rule was 
portrayed as an alternative to constitutional rule, and a renewed 
emphasis was placed on partrimonialism and clientelism, and on 
the essentially personal character of rulership . Although some 
writers had already commented on the importance of leaders in 
particular African states,4 this book was largely responsible for 
placing the individual at the forefront of attempts to explain 
African politics at a general and comparative level. Much of the 
writing on African politics since 1982 has attempted to develop, 
utilize and occasionally refute the centrality of personal rule. In 
this context Africanist political biography has received a boost 
from a methodological shift in political science. 
Yet Africanist political biography remains inherently 
problematical. Some of the problems of are common to political 
biography in general, but other problems may be unique or, at 
least, especially acute in the African context. 
Black Africa lacks a biographical tradition in literature, 
although it does have a very strong oral tradition reflected in praise 
songs and stories concerning political leaders of the past. In some 
cases contemporary leaders have used this rradition by hiring 
praise singers to recount their glories publicly, but in the circum-
stances of such commercial transactions objectivity necessarily 
has a low priority. While this oral source is not to be neglected, 
and indeed often contains much instructive material, it is not 
directly comparable with other biographical traditions. Scholars 
working on political biography elsewhere are likely to have 
available from the start a whole series of biographies and autobi-
ographies relevant to their work. Even if the individual with 
whom they are dealing has not been subjected to biographical 
portrayal, it is very likely that many colleagues , friends and 
opponents have had their activities recorded, and so useful mate-
rial and ideas can be gleaned from such sources . As an example 
of the problems facing Africanists because of a lack of a bio-
graphical tradition, I would mention a personal experience. I was 
approached recently by a publisher who wanted me to write a 
biography of the president of a small West African state on which 
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I have done a considerable amount of research. One of the reasons 
why I turned down this off er was that there exists not a single 
biography or autobiography of any politician in this state from any 
stage of its history. 
For the Africanist biographer even the most basic bio-
graphical information, such as the year of birth of an individual, 
is often unobtainable. All of Africa's post-independence political 
leaders were born in the colonial period. It is likely, especially if 
they were born and raised in the rural areas, that there simply are 
no written records of their early life. Even if records were kept, 
the deterioration of the archival resources in most African states, 
due both to the climate and to poverty (and sometimes to willful 
neglect) makes information retrieval a very chancy business. As 
an extreme case I would cite President Ali Soilih of the Republic 
of the Comoros, who ordered all government records and archives 
burnt in 1977. 
The element of personal rule in many African political 
systems, especially when combined with a "closed" authoritarian 
system, poses problems for biographical works which do not 
focus on the dominant individual leader. This is most evidently 
the case for a work comprising multiple biographies, such as my 
own book. In a number of states, such as Gabon, Malawi, Cote 
d'Ivoire and Zaire, the political system has been overwhelmingly 
dominated by an individual leader (Albert Bongo, Hastings Banda, 
Felix Houphouet-Boigny and Joseph Mobutu, respectively). Since 
these leaders came to power (Banda and Houphouet-Boigny at 
independence, Bongo and Mobutu after independence), they have 
eclipsed all other political leaders to such an extent that it is 
difficult to identify important politicians below the top level of 
government. 
Furthermore, the occupations of even senior government 
officials are often transitory and entirely at the discretion of the 
ruler. The leaders mentioned above, and many others as well, 
have adopted a deliberate policy of blocking the emergence into 
politics of other individuals, because they might become rivals. 
The problems that this creates for political succession are obvious, 
and a key question in many African states is, What happens when 
President X dies? However, in some African states the problem 
is reversed. From 1960 to 1972 Benin (formerly Dahomey) had 
ten different heads of state, some of whom lasted for just a few 
weeks before being removed in a cycle of coups. It is difficult to 
make any sensible assessment of a leader who is in power for such 
a short period of time. 
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The question of assessment is a perennial one for political 
biographers. This is partly due to the individual-environment 
relationship discussed above: How much of the success or failure 
of a political leader can be attributed to environmental factors? 
This involves counterf actual judgements: how different would 
circumstances have been if a particular leader had not been in 
power at a particular time? Also political scientists tend to study 
living political leaders, or those only recently deceased. This has 
some advantages, such as the possibility of interviewing the 
individual in question or his close associates, but it also has 
disadvantages, in that it is difficult to decide if the subject is really 
of long-term significance or is merely of ephemeral interest. 
These issues pose particular problems in the black African con-
text, because the post-independence period is relatively short in 
historical terms, amounting to three decades at most in the 
majority of cases. 
In some modem nations there has been only one leader so 
far, and this obviously precludes comparison other than across 
national boundaries. Such cases also make it difficult to judge the 
durability of the system which the leader has established. In 
Guinea, for example, the political and institutional system estab-
lished by Sekou Toure between 1958 and 1984 survived for only 
a few days after his demise. By contrast the system which Seretse 
Khama established in Botswana survives intact more than a 
decade after his death in 1980. Perhaps the most difficult task for 
African political leaders is to make themselves dispensable. 
I hope that the work I have been doing on multiple 
biographies of African politicians will produce results which have 
a wider interest than the assessment of the particular individuals 
surveyed. One possibility is that these short biographies might 
form part of a database for general comparative use, covering 
information on education, ethnicity, generational cohort, regional 
factors, religion, parental background, former occupation, etc. 
One very firm conclusion that has emerged so far is that it 
is extremely hazardous and insecure being a political leader in 
Africa. The number of African political leaders who have died as 
a result of violence in politics is extremely high, and there are 
many who have spent long periods in prison or exile. Even more 
disturbing is the random way that such reversals of fortune occur. 
Biographies of politicians in the black African context may be 
short and ill-documented by European and American standards, 
yet they are anything but dull. 
I append five biographies of black African politicians as 
examples: 
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DA WDA KAIRABA JA WARA: THE GAMBIA 
Jawara has been the dominant figure in Gambian politics since 
independence, and he has been instrumental in preserving a 
democratic and largely stable political system. 
Born in Barajally in 1924, he was known as David before 
converting to Islam. The son of a Mandinka farmer, he was 
educated locally and in Ghana before going to the University of 
Glasgow, Scotland, where he graduated in veterinary medicine in 
1953. He was the first person from the up-river rural areas of The 
Gambia to hold a university degree. Returning home, he worked 
as a veterinary officer in the colonial administration. In 1959 he 
was one of the founders of the Protectorate People's Party (PPP, 
later the People's Progressive Pany), which was formed to defend 
the interests of rural people, who had hitheno been neglected. 
With the extension of the franchise to the whole of the 
population the PPP won the 1962 election, and Jawara became 
prime minister in the pre-independence government. He retained 
this position after independence in 1965, and was knighted by the 
British in 1966. Shonly after independence he held a referendum 
on a proposal to change the country to a republic, but it was 
narrowly defeated. A second referendum on the subject was held 
in 1970, and this timeitreceivedmajority support. Thismeantthat 
Jawara became president of the new republic, and the British 
monarch ceased to be the formal head of state. 
The Gambia has retained a multi-party liberal-democratic 
political system throughout the post-independence period, but in 
spite of the existence of lively opposition parties, the PPP under 
Jawara's leadership has won a majority of seats in each election. 
The president has exhibited a strong personal commitment to 
democracy and has strongly resisted any suggestion that The 
Gambia should become a one-party state. 
Although his initial success was based on the suppon of 
up-river rural people, once in power he worked to develop a truly 
national base for the PPP. This led to accusations that he was 
neglecting the interests of his own Mandinka ethnic group, the 
largest in the population, but he refused to be drawn into policies 
of ethnic favoritism. He has shown enormous skill in balancing 
the interests of the various ethnic, regional and religious groups 
within the country. 
In July 1981, the political tranquillity of The Gambia was 
temporarily shattered by an attempted coup mounted by members 
of the paramilitary section of the police and discontented urban 
youths. Jawara was in Britain attending a royal wedding when the 
coup took place, but several members of his family were taken 
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hostage by the rebels. To help put down the revolt, the president 
arranged for assistance from the army of neighboring Senegal 
under a mutual defense pact. In the event the rebels were defeated 
and the hostages released, but many people died in the fighting. In 
the ensuing trials due process of law was strictly followed, and 
judges were brought in from other Commonwealth countries to 
help in hearing the cases. The attempted coup appears to have 
been an isolated and atypical incident, and by the following year 
general elections were held in the usual manner. During the 
elections Jawara narrowly escaped death in a helicopter crash 
which killed some of his travelling companions. 
One outcome of Jawara's strategy in reversing the at-
tempted coup of 1981 was the creation of a new confederal 
structure linking The Gambia and Senegal. This proved difficult 
to implement, because of Gambian fears of domination by the 
larger and more powerful Senegalese state. After several years of 
very slow progress, marked by disagreement and tension, the 
confederation finally broke down in 1989. 
Although The Gambia is one of Africa's smallest and 
poorest states Jawara's record over the long period he has been in 
power is impressive. An intelligent, skillful and modest man, he 
will be a hard act to follow. 
KW AME FRANCIS NWIA KOFIE NKRUMAH: GHANA 
Nkrumah was the leading figure in the nationalist movement in 
Anglophone Africa, and arguably in the whole of black Africa . He 
was also the principal leader in the pan-Africanist movement, and 
the first president of Ghana. Although he was overthrown by a 
coup in 1966 and died in exile in 1972, his memory is still a 
powerful influence in many parts of Africa today. 
Born the son of a goldsmith in Nkroful in southwestern 
Ghana in 1909, Nkrumah belonged to the Nzima ethnic group. 
Educated locally, he moved to the USA for higher learning. There 
he received bachelor's and higher degrees in sociology, theology 
and education, and was appointed to an academic post at Lincoln 
University, Pennsylvania. He was also elected president of the 
African Students Organization of the USA and Canada. During 
this time he was much influenced by the writings of Karl Marx , 
Gandhi and particularly Marcus Garvey, who was the major 
source for his pan-African beliefs. In 1945 he moved to England 
to study law, although he probably spent more time working for 
a variety of pan-Africanist organizations and editing the New 
African Magazine. 
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In 1947 he returned to Ghana to become general secretary 
of the recently formed United Gold Coast Convention, a post to 
which he brought remarkable vigor. In 1948 he was arrested along 
with other UGCC leaders following serious rioting. After their 
release, major policy splits developed within the UGCC leader-
ship, with Nkrumah favoring a much more radical, activist ap-
proach to pressing for the end of colonial rule. In 1949 he broke 
away to form his own Convention People's Party (CPP), which 
rapidly developed into the major nationalist party in Ghana. It 
formed close links with trade unions and the urban working 
classes . In the 1951 elections the CPP was the majority party, and 
Nkrumah became leader of government business, and then in 
1952 prime minister. Following repeated election victories he 
retained this position at independence in 1957, and with the 
creation of the republic in 1960 he became president. 
After independence there were two distinct aspects to 
Nkrumah's politics: the international and the domestic . On the 
international front he acted to inspire those Africans still under 
colonial rule. He worked ceaselessly but ultimately unsuccess-
fully to bring about a political union amongst the newly emerging 
states of black Africa, spending large amounts of Ghanaian 
money on this project. The creation of the Organization of African 
Unity in 1963, which represented a bare minimum of cooperation, 
was a disappointment for him, but he regarded it as a starting point 
for a more thoroughgoing union in the future. On the world stage 
he was the most significant African leader of his generation. 
In Ghana itself Nkrumah's period in office was marked by 
economic incompetence and a frightening build-up of political 
repression and corruption. As early as 1958 he introduced a 
preventive detention act which permitted arrest without charge 
and imprisonment without trial. Many opposition leaders were 
victims of this act. Later he moved against all potential centers of 
opposition, including the trade unions, the judiciary, the univer-
sities and the traditional leaders. A rigid state censorship was 
introduced which resulted in the destruction of all parts of the 
mass media which were not totally supportive of himself. In 1964 
all opposition parties were banned, and he proclaimed himself 
"president for life." Throughout this period a massive personality 
cult was erected around Nkrumah as he acquired titles such as 
"star of Ghana," "the redeemer" and "initiator of the African 
personality." Increasingly surrounded by sycophants, he became 
cut off from reality as the country plunged into economic crisis. 
Doubting the loyalty of the army he built up a separate military 
force , the President's Own Guard Regiment, answerable only to 
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himself and better equipped and paid than the regular armed 
forces. 
In February 1966, when Nkrumah was out of the country, 
the army staged a coup which met virtually no resistance and was 
popularly welcomed. He went into exile in Guinea where he was 
granted the honorary title of co-president by his friend and fellow 
pan-Africanist Sekou Toure . While in exile he wrote a number of 
books, but his health began to fail, and in 1972 he died of cancer 
in a Rumanian hospital. 
K wame Nkrumah was inspirational in asserting black 
African dignity, but for Ghana his period of rule was an unquali-
fied disaster. 
SERETSE KHAMA: BOTSWANA 
Khama was a politician of immense skill and integrity, and he was 
the founding father of modern Botswana (previously the Bechua-
naland Protectorate). 
Born in 1921, Khama was a grandson ofKhama the Great 
and the undisputed heir to the powerful B amangwato chieftaincy. 
When his father died in 1925 Seretse was only four years old; his 
uncle Tshekedi was made regent until Seretse came of age and 
completed his education. While reading law at the Inns of Court 
in London, Seretse married a white woman, Ruth Williams, in 
1949. Although his marriage was accepted by the Bamangwato, 
the British government, under pressure from the newly elected 
nationalists in South Africa, banned Seretse and his wife from his 
homeland and stripped him of his hereditary rights to the chief-
taincy. Although this action devastated Seretse at the time, it 
played an important part in his later political success. He main-
tained his enormous traditional prestige in the country, where his 
people continued to regard him as their rightful leader, but he was 
never encumbered with the very considerable but essentially 
mundane day-to-day duties which went with the chieftaincy. 
Khama emerged as a modern, well-educated leader who gained 
widespread support, not merely local tribal loyalty. The Botswana 
Democratic Party (BDP), which he was instrumental in founding 
in 1962, won sweeping victories in every subsequent election and 
has proved itself a truly national party. Khama was a traditional 
leader who used his prestige to transfer the traditional powers of 
chiefs to the new democratically elected central government. And 
he was also the leading Bamangwato who reduced inter-tribal 
animosities and encouraged his people to leave tribal loyalty 
behind and to identify with the new national state . 
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Seretse Khama was president of Botswana from inde-
pendence in 1966 until his death in 1980. Under his leadership this 
period was one of quite remarkable progress. Economically the 
country was one of Africa's success stories: real national per 
capita income tripled as both agriculture and mineral extraction 
boomed. A unified, efficient and non-corrupt state srructure was 
created to replace the loose aggregation of tribes, held together by 
a tenuous and half-hearted colonial administration. During his 
tenure the political system continued to be both stable and demo-
cratic with a full range of civil liberties and regular free and fair 
elections. Seretse' s personal abhorrence of racial discrimination 
and apartheid led him to pursue a successful policy of non-
racialism within the country, and relations there between black 
and white were marked by an absence of tension. 
Khama also emerged as an international statesman of 
great repute and as a force for moderation among the frontline 
states. He played an important role in solving the Rhodesia/ 
Zimbabwe crisis. His commitment to human rights did not extend 
merely to attacks on white racism. He was one of the few African 
leaders who openly criticized theruleofldi Amin in Uganda while 
Amin was still in power. As a protest against the atrocities of the 
Amin regime, Khama refused to attend the Organization of 
African Unity summit when it was held in Kampala. Khama was 
always a skillful politician, never a tyrant, and he was a natural 
conciliator. The extent of his success is all the greater when seen 
in the context of Botswana's distinctly unfavorable location-
land-locked and surrounded by strife-torn southern Africa. 
Khama's greatest legacy to Botswana was to have made 
himself dispensable and to have built up a system that could 
survive his departure. Since his death from cancer in July 1980 
Botswana has remained a democratic and prosperous state, run-
ning on the lines he laid down. 
AHMED (MATHIEU) KEREKOU: BE:t\TIN 
Since seizing power in a coup in 1972 Kerekou proved to be much 
the most durable of Benin's post-independence heads of state, 
most of whom lasted only a short time in office. In March 1991 
he was defeated in the first competitive presidential election to 
take place in Benin for several decades. 
Born into the Somba ethnic group in 1933, Kerekou 
completed his military training in France, transferring from the 
French to the Dahomean army in 1961. From 1961 to 1962 he 
served as an aide to President Maga, and his progress through the 
army command structure was helped by the fact that he was the 
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cousin of Colonel Kouandete, who acted as his patron. Kerekou 
assisted his cousin in staging a coup in 1967, and he was made 
president of the revolutionary military committee. After the 
return to civilian rule in Dahomey in 1968, Kerekou went to 
France for further military training and was not involved in his 
cousin's second coup of 1969. In 1970 he was appointed deputy 
chief of staff of the army. 
In October 1972 Kerekou led his own coup, overthrowing 
the government of Ahomadegbe. He then purged the army of 
officers senior to himself and became army chief of staff as well 
as head of state. Although Kerekou had previously exhibited little 
interest in political ideologies, he suddenly announced in 1974 
that the country had been transformed into a Marxist-Leninist 
state. But it was not until the following year that the Benin 
People's Revolutionary Party (PRPB) could be fully established 
as the only legal party; Kerekou was its leader. In 1975 he changed 
the name of the state from Dahomey to Benin, an ancient African 
kingdom. His declaration of Marxism-Leninism was accompa-
nied by large-scale nationalization of the economy and a massive 
expansion of the bureaucracy. At one stage bureaucratic salaries 
were costing 92 per cent of the state budget, though they were paid 
in an erratic fashion. 
In 1977 Benin adopted a new constitution, creating a 
revolutionary national assembly. In 1979 there were elections, for 
which only PRPB members were enfranchised. In 1980 this body 
formally elected Kerekou as president. In theory Benin then had 
a civilian government, although military influence remained 
strong, and it was not until 1987 that Kerekou officially resigned 
from the army. 
In 1980 Kerekou converted to Islam while on a state visit 
to Libya, changing his first name from Mathieu to Ahmed. For a 
time Benin enjoyed very cordial relations with Libya as Kerekou 
sought to project a "radical" international image. By the mid-
1980s, however, he was seeking closer ties with western countries 
in order to gain financial aid for his bankrupt economy. In 1985 
he announced to the PRPB congress that he had approached the 
International Monetary Fund for assistance, and since then the 
Marxist rhetoric of the regime has been considerably toned down 
and eventually abandoned . 
Towards the end of the 1980s domestic pressure on the 
regime grew, and in February 1990 Kerekou agreed to allow for 
the re-introduction of a multi-party system. In the interim period 
he retained the presidency but agreed to relinquish his defense 
portfolio. In March 1991 he was convincingly defeated in the 
presidential election. However, although he was eventually 
114 
ousted, he has to be judged a remarkable survivor. Prior to his 
nearly two decades in power the country had ten changes of ruler, 
mostly violent, in twelve years. Through a mixture of political 
skill and oppressive force he managed to engineer a precarious 
stability for his regime. 
JULIUS KAMBARAGE NYERERE: TANZANIA 
Nyerere has been one of Africa's most highly regarded statesmen 
in the post-independence period. He was head of state until 
retiring from the presidency in 1985. 
Born in 1922 in Butiama into one of the smallest ethnic 
groups in the country, the Zanaki, he trained as a teacher in 
Uganda and taught for several years in Tabora. From 1949 to 1952 
he was a student at the University of Edinburgh where he became 
his country's first graduate. He returned home to teach and begin 
his political career. In 1954 he founded the Tanganyika African 
National Union (TANU), which was to become the ruling party, 
and became its president. In the 1958 and 1960 elections T ANU 
won overwhelming majorities and became one of the very few 
nationalist parties to experience no serious opposition in the late 
colonial phase. Nyerere became chief minister in the pre-inde-
pendence government and in December 1961 the country's first 
post-independence prime minister. Shortly afterwards he re-
signed the premiership for a few months to devote himself to 
reorganizing the party, and with the creation of a republic in 1962, 
when the British monarch ceased to be the formal head of state, he 
became the country's first president. 
There is linle doubt that under Nyerere's leadership 
Tanzania has been amongst the more politically stable states in 
Africa, although there is considerable debate as to how far this is 
a result of leadership or how far it is due to an absence of 
significant ethnic and regional cleavages of the sort which have 
afflicted other African states. It is probably accurate to say that 
Tanzania has faced less intractable political difficulties than most 
states in black Africa. Apart from an army mutiny in 1964, which 
was not a coup and was easily dealt with by British forces , and a 
genuine but unsuccessful coup attempt in 1983, the regime has not 
been subjected to any very serious challenges . 
In 1964 Nyerere negotiated the union of mainland Tanga-
nyika and the offshore island of Zanzibar to form a single state, 
although for many years the union was stronger on paper than in 
fact and still contains unresolved tensions. Before the 1965 
elections he altered the political system in Tanzania (excluding 
Zanzibar) to a single-party state, but with some allowance for 
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electoral competition between candidates within T ANU. In 1977 
a new pany, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM-Pany of the Revolu-
tion) was formed with the merger of T ANU and the Zanzibari 
Afro-Shirazi Pany (ASP). Nyerere was continuously leader of 
T ANU and CCM until he retired from the leadership of the latter 
in 1990. In 1967 the Arusha Declaration established a leadership 
code for pany and government elites in an attempt to prevent 
single-pany dominance leading to abuse of office, but it is 
generally agreed that this has been at best only panially success-
ful. Although he was for many years the most aniculate defender 
of the single-pany state in Africa, by the late 1980s Nyerere was 
becoming increasingly critical of this form of government and 
was arguing that lack of opposition had produced complacency 
and neglect of the public interest in Tanzania. Some of his critics 
put it more strongly and claimed that the dominance ofTANU and 
CCM had created a new elite which had used its undisputed 
control to further its own interests. 
In terms of economic development the period of Nyerere's 
presidency produced extremely disappointing results. Following 
the adoption of"African socialism" the most significant sectors of 
the economy were nationalized and placed under the control of the 
state and the party, but performance standards have been very 
poor. In the 1970s a major attempt was made to restructure 
agricultural production with the creation of "ujamaa" (commu-
nal) villages. At first this was done on a voluntary basis, but when 
the peasants failed to respond, compulsion, often involving high 
levels of coercion, was used. The whole scheme is now recog-
nized as a failure . By the late 1980s Tanzania was moving slowly 
toward a more liberal form of economic policy . 
In the international arena Nyerere has rightly been re-
garded as one of Africa's leading statesmen. Although Tanzania 
has received aid from a variety of sources, especially the USA, it 
has managed to follow a policy of genuine non-alignment. Nyerere 
has been amongst the leading critics of apartheid in South Africa 
but has also attacked abuses of human rights in black-ruled states, 
and in 1979 the Tanzanian army overthrew the despotic rule of Idi 
Amin in neighboring Uganda. Nyerere has also been a leading 
supporter of economic cooperation between the black-ruled states 
of the Southern African region. He has also emerged as the 
leading intellectual amongst Africa's political leaders , and his 
numerous writings on "African socialism" have been extremely 
influential, although by the 1990s they were viewed with increas-
ing criticism. His literary achievements include the translation of 
Shakespeare's plays into Swahili. 
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In 1985 Nyerere retired from the presidency, although he 
continued to lead the ruling pany until 1990. Although the fruits 
of his period in power were not entirely positive, nobody can 
doubt his integrity, personal humility and dedication to improving 
the lot of the Tanzanian people who continued to respect "Mwal-
imu" (Swahili for "teacher") in spite of the problems that Tanza-
nia has continued to experience. 
NOTES 
1 Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar, 1991. The five sample 
biographies at the conclusion of this anicle are drawn from the text 
of this book. 
2 Political biography, however, is perhaps becoming more impor-
tant in political science. Professor OlofRuin of the University of 
Stockholm has outlined this issue in the terms of reference for the 
Workshop on "PoliticalBiography"fortheEuropean Consortium 
for Political Research Joint Sessions, held at Bochum, Germany, 
April 2-7, 1990. He commented that an "interest in political 
biography seems to be rising in political science" and that this 
"grov.ring interest is in turn correlated with growing interest 
generally in the problems of political leadership." However his 
remark that in "the ideological climate of today single individuals 
tend to be in focus" is problematic for me, because it seems to 
suggest a depersonalized "guiding hand." 
3 Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982. 
4 See, for example, my "Botswana: The Achievement of Seretse 
Khama," The Round Table, no. 280 (October 1980), pp. 409-14. 
This was not written within a framework that stressed personal 
rule, nor did it stress clientelism. 
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